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Abstract
I characterize optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when
nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker
controls the short-term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under dis-
cretionary policy, accounting for ﬁscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare
losses associated with the presence of the zero bound. Under commitment, the gains associated
with the use of the ﬁscal policy tool remain modest, even though ﬁscal stabilization policy is part
of the optimal policy mix.
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In the course of the recent global ﬁnancial crisis central banks around the world have lowered nom-
inal interest rates to record low levels. At the same time, many governments initiated ﬁscal stimulus
programs intended to ﬁght recession. This has led to a renewed interest in disentangling the roles of
monetary and ﬁscal policy as stabilization tools in low interest rate environments.
In this paper, I study optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in a stylized stochastic New Keynesian
model that takes the zero nominal interest rate bound explicitly into account. The benevolent policy-
maker possesses two instruments, spending on public goods generating utility to consumers and the
short-term nominal interest rate. Adverse shocks occasionally force the policymaker to drive nominal
interest rates to zero. The model is solved with a global solution method and used to explore the
implications of the zero bound for the optimal monetary and ﬁscal stabilization policy mix, the equi-
librium responses of the economy to exogenous shocks, and private agents’ welfare under alternative
discretionary and commitment policies.
I provide both, qualitatively and quantitatively new results. It is well-known that the zero bound im-
poses a major constraint on the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy if the policymaker
is unable to commit to future state-contingent policy actions (e.g. Adam and Billi, 2007; Nakov,
2008). I show that ﬁscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare costs associated
with the presence of the zero lower bound. For a standard calibration to the US economy, the uncon-
ditional welfare loss in the model with zero bound does not differ much from the loss generated in a
model that ignores the zero bound.
Under the optimal discretionary policy, government spending is raised above the level consistent with
the efﬁcient equilibrium whenever the zero bound becomes binding, thereby mitigating the drop in
the output gap and the inﬂation rate. In normal times, only monetary policy is used to stabilize the
economy. Nevertheless, ﬁscal policy also affects the equilibrium responses of the macroeconomic
variables when the nominal interest rate is positive. Adam and Billi (2007) and Nakov (2008) show
that the asymmetry in the capability of discretionary monetary policy to counteract expansionary and
contractionary disturbances in the presence of the zero bound creates a deﬂationary bias in private
sector expectations. With active ﬁscal policy, private agents anticipate that expansions in government
2spending will be used to stabilize the economy in states with zero nominal interest rates. This miti-
gates the bias in agents’ expectations, thereby improving the policymaker’s stabilization performance
in all states and reducing the likelihood of zero bound events.
The welfare gains from discretionary ﬁscal policy can be enhanced by the appointment of an activist
policymaker who puts less weight on stabilizing government spending than the private sector does.
Intuitively, under discretion, the policymaker does not take into account how her actions affect private
agents’ expectations when solving her optimization problem. The appointment of an activist policy-
maker allows us to exploit the welfare-improving effect of active ﬁscal stabilization policy at the zero
bound on the equilibrium dynamics in normal times despite the lack of a commitment device.
Under commitment, the welfare gains from active ﬁscal policy are negligible. Qualitatively, at the
zero lower bound the optimal policy plan prescribes the implementation of a transitory government
spending stimulus, which is followed by a ﬁscal retrenchment. In comparison to the case where only
monetary policy is used as a stabilization tool, allowing for active ﬁscal policy dampens the required
amount of costly above-target inﬂation promised to be delivered in the future.
The paper can be related to several studies on optimal monetary policy in the presence of the zero
lower bound that solve fully stochastic models but abstract from ﬁscal stabilization policy. Adam and
Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008) characterize optimal monetary policy in forward-looking New
Keynesian models with occasionally binding zero lower bound and show that it is important to take the
stochastic nature of the economy into account, whereas Orphanides and Wieland (2000) and Kato and
Nishiyama (2005) study optimal monetary policy in backward-looking stochastic models. Billi (2011)
compares the optimal long-run inﬂation rate under commitment and under discretion. Bodenstein et
al. (2012) consider optimal monetary policy under imperfect credibility.1 Model-based experiments
on ﬁscal policy at the zero bound have mainly centered on the ﬁscal multiplier, see e.g. Cogan et al.
(2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Woodford (2011), and Coenen et al. (2012). An exception is Mankiw
and Weinzierl (2011) who examine optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in a deterministic two-period
model with short-term nominal rigidities. Instead, this paper determines optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policy in a fully stochastic forward-looking inﬁnite-horizon model, thereby taking into account eco-
1Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) characterize optimal monetary policy for an economy with two states in which some
deterministic shock has pushed nominal interest rates to zero in the initial period, and there is a constant probability to return
forever to the non-crisis state in the subsequent periods. Jung et al. (2005) and Levin et al. (2010) study optimal monetary
policy at the zero bound in the standard New Keynesian model under perfect foresight.
3nomic uncertainty and its interactions with the zero lower bound.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model environment.
Section 3 characterizes optimal discretionary monetary and ﬁscal policy. Optimal policy plans under
commitment are considered in section 4. Section 5 presents the welfare analysis. Section 6 examines
the desirability of a discretionary policymaker who puts less weight on stabilizing government spend-
ing than the private sector does. The sensitivity analysis is conducted in section 7. Finally, section 8
concludes.
2 The model
The economy is represented by a stylized New Keynesian model as described in detail in e.g. Wood-
ford (2003) that has been widely used for policy analysis. The representative household consumes
composite private and public consumption goods and supplies labor to the production sector, where
utility is separable in all three arguments as in Woodford (2011).2 Firms employ industry-speciﬁc la-
bor and use a constant-return-to-scale technology to produce differentiated goods that can be used for
private or public consumption. They act under monopolistic competition and are subject to staggered
price-setting as in Calvo (1983). The policymaker attempts to maximize the expected lifetime utility
of the representative household. She decides about the level of government spending on the public
consumption good and about the one-period nominal interest rate, where the latter is constrained by
the zero lower bound. Government expenditures are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes. Time is discrete and
indexed by t. A detailed description of the model is provided in the online appendix to this paper.3
2I am considering a cashless limiting economy in the sense of Woodford (2003), abstracting from the role of monetary
frictions. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show for a model similar to the one used here that the optimal stabilization
policy can be analyzed without an explicit treatment of central bank open-market operations.
3The online appendix is available from http://www.sebastianschmidt.eu and upon request from the author.
42.1 Private sector behavior
The optimization problems of the representative household and goods-producing ﬁrms result in the
following behavioral constraints
ˆ πt = κ
￿
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Equation (1) is a New Keynesian Phillips curve originating from ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization, and
Equation (2) is a dynamic IS curve originating from the representative household’s intertemporal
optimization. The model equations have been log-linearized around the non-stochastic steady state
with the gross inﬂation rate set equal to 1. Variables with a hat are expressed in percentage deviations
from steady state, where ˆ πt denotes the inﬂation rate, ˆ Y
gap
t represents the output gap, ˆ G
gap
t is the
government spending gap expressed as a share of steady state output and ˆ Rt denotes the nominal
interest rate between period t and t + 1. The output gap is deﬁned as the difference between the
actual level of output and the level of output consistent with the efﬁcient equilibrium.4 Similarly, the
government spending gap is deﬁned as the difference between actual government spending and the
level of government spending consistent with the efﬁcient equilibrium.
The parameter β ∈ (0,1) denotes the subjective discount factor and σ > 0 is the inverse of the
elasticity of the marginal utility of private consumption with respect to total output. The parameters κ
and Γ are functions of the structural parameters
κ =
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α(1 + ηθ)
￿
σ−1 + η
￿
, Γ =
σ−1
σ−1 + η
,
where α ∈ (0,1) denotes the share of ﬁrms that cannot reoptimize their price in a given period, η > 0
denotes the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply, and θ > 1 represents the steady state of the price
elasticity of demand for differentiated goods.
The model economy is subject to two composite shocks, both following stationary autoregressive
4I assume that the distortions arising from monopolistic competition in the non-stochastic steady state are offset by an
appropriate wage subsidy, so that the non-stochastic ﬂexible-price steady state corresponds to the efﬁcient steady state.
5processes
ut = ρuut−1 + ǫu
t (3)
dt = ρddt−1 + ǫd
t, (4)
where ǫ
j
t, j ∈ {u,d} are i.i.d. N(0,σ2
j) innovations. Here, ut is an inefﬁcient supply disturbance
representing price markup shocks, and dt captures variations in the real interest rate consistent with
the efﬁcient equilibrium r∗
t, henceforth referred to as the efﬁcient real rate of interest
ut = −
κ
(θ − 1)(σ−1 + η)
log(θt/θ) (5)
dt = σ (r∗
t − r∗), (6)
where r∗ = 1
β −1 denotes the steady state of the efﬁcient real interest rate.5 Finally, it provides useful
to deﬁne the level of the nominal interest rate as it ≡ ˆ Rt + r∗.
2.2 The policy objective
The policymaker’s objective function originates from a linear-quadratic approximation to household
welfare6
L0 = E0
∞ X
t=0
βt1
2
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The relative weights λ,λG are functions of the structural parameters
λ =
κ
θ
, λG = λΓ
￿
1 − Γ +
σ
ω
￿
,
where ω denotes the inverse of the elasticity of the marginal utility of public consumption with respect
to total output.
5The efﬁcient real rate of interest is a function of preference and technology shocks, though, to facilitate computation
I do not consider the relative importance of these shocks for the ﬂuctuations in the efﬁcient real rate. Further details are
provided in the online appendix.
6The details of the derivation are provided in the online appendix. Levin et al. (2010) show in the context of a perfect-
foresight model with monetary commitment that the optimality conditions for the linear-quadratic problem are equivalent
to a ﬁrst-order approximation of the optimality conditions for the non-linear policy problem.
62.3 Calibration
The model economy is calibrated to the US economy. The parameterization follows Woodford (2003)
and Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), and is summarized in Table 1. The period length is one quarter. Two
Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Economic interpretation
r∗ 3.5/4 Steady state efﬁcient rate of interest (in %)
β 0.9913 Discount factor
G/Y 0.2 Steady state share of government spending in total output
α 0.66 Share of ﬁrms per period keeping prices unchanged
θ 7.66 Price elasticity of demand in the steady state
η 0.47 Elasticity of real marginal costs with respect to the ﬁrm’s own output level
σ 6.25 Inverse elasticity of marginal utility of private consumption w.r.t. total output
ω 1.56 Inverse elasticity of marginal utility of public consumption w.r.t. total output
κ 0.0244 New Keynesian Phillips curve parameter
ρu 0 AR-coefﬁcient cost-push shock
ρd 0.8 AR-coefﬁcient efﬁcient real rate shock
Sd(ǫu
t ) 0.154 Standard deviation cost-push shock innovation (in %)
Sd
￿
ǫd
t
￿
1.524 Standard deviation efﬁcient rate shock innovation (in %)
λ 0.0032 Loss function weight I
λG 0.0038 Loss function weight II
additional parameters have to be calibrated, the steady state ratio of government spending to real GDP
G/Y and the elasticity of the marginal utility of public good consumption with respect to total output
ω−1. Following Gal´ ı et al. (2007) and Christiano et al. (2011), the steady state share of government
spending in total output is set equal to 20 percent, a standard value for the US economy. In the baseline
calibration, the parameter ω is chosen such that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in public
consumption equals the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in private consumption as in Woodford
(2011), however, different parameter values of ω are considered in the sensitivity analysis section.
3 Optimal policy under discretion
I ﬁrst determine the optimal policy under discretion. Optimal plans for monetary and ﬁscal policy are
considered in the subsequent section. Without commitment, the policymaker is unable to manipulate
beliefs about future policy and therefore takes private sector expectations as given when solving her
7optimization problem.7 Each period t, the policymaker chooses inﬂation, the output gap, the govern-
ment spending gap and the nominal interest rate to minimize her objective function subject to the zero
nominal interest rate bound and the behavioral constraints
min
ˆ πt,ˆ Y
gap
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gap
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Et
∞ X
j=0
βj1
2
￿
ˆ π2
t+j + λ
￿
ˆ Y
gap
t+j − Γ ˆ G
gap
t+j
￿2
+ λG
￿
ˆ G
gap
t+j
￿2￿
subject to
ˆ Rt ≥ −r∗
Equations (1) - (4)
ut,dt given
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t+j, ˆ Rt+j ≥ −r∗} given for j ≥ 1.
The consolidated ﬁrst-order conditions read
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= 0 (9)
ˆ Rt ≥ −r∗ (10)
κˆ πt + λ
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ˆ Y
gap
t − Γ ˆ G
gap
t
￿
≤ 0. (11)
If the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is not binding, condition (11) has to hold with
equality. Conditions (8) and (11) then imply that only monetary policy is used as a stabilization
tool, whereas the government spending gap remains closed ˆ G
gap
t = 0. There are two reasons why
monetary policy is preferred to ﬁscal policy in normal times. First, variations in the nominal interest
rate unlike variations in the government spending gap do not by themselves create welfare costs.
Second, even if monetary policy is unable to completely stabilize inﬂation and the output gap, as is
the case in the face of price markup shocks, government spending is a less efﬁcient stabilization tool
than the short-term nominal interest rate. Consider an inﬂationary cost-push shock. If the policymaker
uses the ﬁscal policy instrument to dampen the rise in the inﬂation rate, she must reduce the level of
7I consider Markov-perfect equilibria. The policymaker acts as Stackelberg leader and the private sector and future
policymakers are Stackelberg followers.
8government spending. This lowers aggregate demand, labor demand declines and the equilibrium real
wage falls, thereby counteracting the inﬂationary pressures. However, since the equilibrium hours
of work decline, total output has to decrease. If the policymaker uses monetary policy, the increase
in the nominal interest rate dampens private consumption. On the one hand this lowers aggregate
demand, triggering the same transmission mechanism as before, but on the other hand the fall in
private consumption ceteris paribus increases households’ labor supply. In equilibrium, hours worked,
and hence total output, have to fall by less than would be the case under ﬁscal stabilization policy.8
However, when the zero lower bound renders nominal interest rate policy ineffective, ﬁscal policy is
used to stabilize the economy. In particular, from (8) and (11) follows
ˆ G
gap
t = −
1 − Γ
λΓσ
ω
h
κˆ πt + λˆ Y
gap
t
i
≥ 0. (12)
The rational expectations equilibrium under optimal discretionary monetary and ﬁscal policy is then
characterized by policy functions ˆ π (ut,dt), ˆ Y gap (ut,dt), ˆ Ggap (ut,dt) and ˆ R(ut,dt) solving con-
ditions (1) - (2), and (8) - (11). I use the collocation method to obtain approximations of the unknown
policy functions.9 The algorithm is described in the online appendix. Under the linear-quadratic ap-
proach, the zero bound constraint is the only nonlinearity that is explicitly taken into account. The
advantage of this approach is that it facilitates computation and allows for straightforward comparison
with the literature on optimal policy without zero bound.10 Figure 1 shows equilibrium responses of
the endogenous variables to the efﬁcient real rate of interest for the baseline calibration. I consider
two types of policy regimes, the baseline case with optimization over monetary and ﬁscal policy (la-
beled “With ﬁscal”) and an alternative scenario with optimization over monetary policy only (labeled
“No ﬁscal”). The non-stochastic steady state is the same for both regimes, but under the latter gov-
ernment spending is not used for stabilization policy, i.e. ˆ G
gap
t = 0 for all t. The implications of
active ﬁscal policy are twofold. First, for small realizations of the efﬁcient real rate that lead to a
8Eser et al. (2009) show that the lack of a role for government spending stabilization policy is a quite general feature of
optimal policy in New Keynesian models without zero interest rate bound that is robust to several model extensions.
9The collocation method allows us to take the uncertainty arriving from the stochastic nature of the efﬁcient real rate
shock and the markup shock correctly into account in that agents’ expectations represent probability distributions over
future economic outcomes. Earlier work by Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008) has shown that it is crucial
not to abstract from this dimension of the problem in that the solution of the analogue perfect-foresight model considerably
underestimates the welfare costs associated with the zero lower bound.
10See also the discussion in Adam and Billi (2006).
9Figure 1: Equilibrium responses to the efﬁcient real rate of interest under discretion
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Notes: Equilibrium responses to the efﬁcient real interest rate shock under optimal discretionary policy are shown for the
baseline calibration. Inﬂation and interest rates are expressed in annualized percentage points. The value of the cost-push
shock is set equal to zero.
binding zero bound constraint, ﬁscal stabilization policy attenuates the decline in the output gap and
in the inﬂation rate compared to the constrained regime that relies only on monetary policy. Second,
even though ﬁscal policy is only used as a stabilization tool at the zero ﬂoor, it also affects equilib-
rium responses when nominal interest rates are positive. In particular, note, that discretionary policy
also fails to stabilize inﬂation and the output gap for realizations of the efﬁcient real rate above the
threshold below which the zero bound becomes binding. Adding the ﬁscal stabilization tool helps to
dampen the inefﬁcient responses of the output gap and the inﬂation rate. Speciﬁcally, ﬁscal policy re-
duces the adherent asymmetry in the capability of the public sector to counteract positive and negative
shocks to the efﬁcient real rate in low interest rate environments. While the policymaker is always
able to raise nominal interest rates in order to offset positive shocks to the efﬁcient real rate of interest,
discretionary monetary policy looses power to stabilize inﬂation and output once a large enough neg-
ative rate shock occurs such that the zero bound becomes binding. This creates a deﬂationary bias in
10private agents’ expectations.11 Incorporating ﬁscal stabilization policy, the private sector anticipates
that government spending will respond to the shock once monetary policy becomes ineffective. This
anticipation mitigates the bias in agents’ expectations about future economic outcomes, leading to an
improved stabilization performance. Importantly, the attenuation of the deﬂationary bias reduces the
likelihood of zero lower bound events.
4 Optimal policy under commitment
This section determines optimal policy under commitment. The benevolent policymaker chooses
state-contingent paths for inﬂation, the output gap, the government spending gap and the nominal
interest rate to minimize her objective function subject to the zero nominal interest rate bound and the
behavioral constraints
min
ˆ πt,ˆ Y
gap
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gap
t , ˆ Rt
E0
∞ X
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βt1
2
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￿2
+ λG
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gap
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subject to
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Equations (1) - (4)
u0,d0 given,
11See Adam and Billi (2007) and Nakov (2008) for further discussion of the deﬂationary bias under discretionary policy.
11for all t = 0,1,...,∞.
The resulting equilibrium conditions read
ˆ πt − φt + φt−1 −
σ
β
µt−1 = 0 (13)
λ
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t − Γ ˆ G
gap
t
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+ κφt + µt −
1
β
µt−1 = 0 (14)
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gap
t (15)
µt ≥ 0 (16)
ˆ Rt ≥ −r∗ (17)
µt
￿
ˆ Rt + r∗
￿
= 0, (18)
as well as (1) and (2), where φt and µt denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the policy
problem, and φ−1,µ−1 = 0. Under commitment, optimal policy introduces history dependence as
reﬂected by the lagged Lagrange multipliers in (13) - (15). Equation (15) relates the government
spending gap to the contemporaneous and lagged zero-lower-bound multipliers. The positive coef-
ﬁcient on the contemporaneous multiplier implies that the policymaker raises government spending
above the level consistent with the efﬁcient equilibrium when the nominal interest rate hits the zero
lower bound. However, unlike in the discretionary regime, the ﬁscal stimulus is followed by a spend-
ing reversal, as shown by the negative coefﬁcient on the lagged multiplier. Since 1
β > 1, it may well
be that the ﬁscal retrenchment is implemented while the zero bound is still binding.
The rational expectations equilibrium under commitment is then characterized by policy functions
ˆ π (Ωt), ˆ Y gap (Ωt), ˆ Ggap (Ωt), ˆ R(Ωt), φ(Ωt) and µ(Ωt), with Ωt = (ut,dt,φt−1,µt−1), solving (1)
- (2) and (13) - (18). The numerical algorithm is described in the online appendix.
Figure 2 shows impulse responses to an efﬁcient real interest rate shock of −3 unconditional standard
deviations for the baseline calibration.12 The optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy plan is compared to
the corresponding discretionary regime and to the constrained commitment regime which can only
use monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. In all three regimes, the shock drives
12I show impulse responses instead of equilibrium responses to characterize the commitment regime, since otherwise
I would have to condition the responses to the efﬁcient real rate on certain realizations of the two lagged commitment
multipliers.
12Figure 2: Impulse responses to an efﬁcient real rate shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to an efﬁcient real interest rate shock of −3 unconditional standard deviations are shown for the
baseline calibration. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are expressed in annualized percentage points.
nominal interest rates to zero and output and inﬂation fall initially below their target levels. Under
commitment, the policymaker promises to keep nominal interest rates low for long enough in order
to create a transitory economic boom in subsequent periods. Accordingly, private agents’ inﬂation
expectations increase and real interest rates decline below zero, thereby mitigating the initial drop in
the target variables compared to the discretionary regime. If the policymaker acting under commit-
ment has two stabilization tools at her disposal, ﬁscal policy incurs some of the burden to stabilize
the economy. In response to the shock, the policymaker initially raises government spending above
the level consistent with the efﬁcient equilibrium. The spending stimulus, which is smaller than under
discretion, dampens the decline in aggregate demand and inﬂation. As a consequence, the optimal
amount of costly above-target inﬂation promised to be delivered in the future is smaller than under the
constrained commitment regime. In order to cushion the inﬂation boom the policymaker engineers a
reversal in government spending. At this point, ﬁscal policy is preferred to monetary policy. Future
levels of government spending have only an indirect effect on today’s private consumption through
13their impact on the inﬂation path, whereas a less accommodative nominal interest rate policy would
have a direct adverse effect on today’s private consumption level through the intertemporal optimality
condition of the representative household.
5 Welfare analysis
The previous sections have shown that endogenous government spending improves the ability of the
public sector to stabilize inﬂation and the output gap in response to contracting shocks to the efﬁcient
real rate of interest. However, ﬁscal stabilization policy by itself creates costs. This section aims to
quantify the overall welfare effects.
I calculate the average discounted welfare loss across 2000 simulations with a length of 1000 periods
each. Table2 reportsthe resultsforthebaselinecalibration. TheﬁrstrowofTable2presents thelosses
Table 2: Welfare losses
Policy regime
Discretion Commitment
No ﬁscal With ﬁscal Activist ﬁscal No ﬁscal With ﬁscal
Equivalent consumption loss 0.0285 0.0256 0.0254 0.0193 0.0192
Loss increase with zero bound 15.2% 3.8% 3.0% 0.6% 0.4%
Notes: The ﬁrst row reports welfare losses expressed in terms of the equivalent permanent reduction in private consumption
in percent of its non-stochastic steady state level. The second row reports the percentage increase in the consumption loss if
the model takes the zero bound into account.
in terms of the equivalent permanent reduction in private consumption (in percent).13 The second row
reports the costs associated with the presence of the zero bound in terms of the percentage increase in
the consumption loss if the model takes the zero bound into account. If the policymaker is unable to
commit to future policy actions and uses only monetary policy as a stabilization tool, then explicitly
accounting for the presence of the zero bound leads to an increase in the unconditional welfare loss of
about 15.2%, where the zero bound constraint is binding in about 2.4 percent of the simulated periods.
The picture changes once we allow for active ﬁscal policy. Employing government spending as an
additional stabilization tool quarters the welfare costs associated with the presence of the zero bound
under the discretionary policy regime and reduces the frequency of zero bound events to 2.1 percent.
13The transformation of the losses from objective function (7) into equivalent consumption losses is described in the
online appendix.
14Importantly, the overall consumption loss under discretionary monetary and ﬁscal policy with zero
bound is not much higher than the loss observed for discretionary policy when abstracting from the
zero ﬂoor.
The welfare losses under policy commitment are reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2. In this case,
the introduction of ﬁscal stabilization policy has almost no effect on the overall stabilization perfor-
mance. This is not surprising, given that the optimal monetary policy plan alone is already able to
almost completely offset the welfare effects arising from the zero bound, as shown in the second row
of Table 2.
Taken together, the previous results imply that the value of policy commitment, deﬁned as the differ-
ence between the consumption losses under discretion and under commitment, is much lower if both
monetary and ﬁscal policy are used as stabilization tools than in the case without active ﬁscal policy.
Speciﬁcally, once we account for endogenous government spending, the value of policy commitment
in the model with zero lower bound is not much higher than normally obtained when abstracting from
the zero ﬂoor.
6 Activist ﬁscal policy
This section shows that, under discretion, the gains from ﬁscal stabilization policy can be enhanced by
appointing a policymaker who puts less weight on stabilizing government spending than the private
sector does.
Without commitment, the policy problem reduces to a sequence of static optimization problems.14
Hence, the discretionary policymaker ignores the welfare-improving effect of the ﬁscal stimulus at
the zero lower bound on the stabilization performance in normal times. In the following, I replace the
parameter λG in the policymaker’s objective function (7) by the parameter ˜ λG > λΓ(1 − Γ) which
may differ from society’s weight on the stabilization of government purchases. Figure 3 displays the
costs associated with the zero bound in terms of the increase in the consumption loss if the model takes
the zero bound into account for alternative values of ˜ λG, evaluated using the weight λG. The outcome
in the baseline case where the policymaker and private agents put the same weight on the stabilization
14Note, that the model exhibits no endogenous state variable under the discretionary regime.
15Figure 3: Loss increase under discretionary policy if the zero bound is taken into account
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the increase in consumption losses under discretionary policy if the model takes the zero nominal
interest rate bound into account for alternative values of the weight on government spending gap stabilization in the policy-
maker’s objective function, ˜ λG. The circle denotes the outcome when ˜ λG = λG. The smallest loss increase is denoted by a
diamond.
of government purchases is denoted by a circle. The best-performing discretionary policymaker,
denoted by a diamond, however, puts a smaller weight on the stabilization of government purchases.
ThecorrespondingconsumptionlossisreportedinthethirdcolumnofTable2labeled“Activistﬁscal.”
Whenever the zero bound becomes binding, the activist policymaker raises the government spending
gap by more than in the baseline case. At that time, the more-active policy is not welfare optimal since
the costs of the additional ﬁscal stimulus outweigh the mitigated decline in the output gap and in the
inﬂation rate. However, the improved stabilization performance in normal times which itself makes
zero bound events less likely, leads to an overall reduction of the unconditional welfare loss.
167 Sensitivity analysis
This section examines to which extent the welfare results obtained under the baseline calibration are
robust to changes in parameter values.
Recent studies have argued that research based on macroeconomic models estimated for the Great
Moderation period might have underestimated the likelihood and the severity of zero bound events,
see e.g. Chung et al. (2012). One way to address this issue is to consider the welfare effects from
lowering the steady state efﬁcient real rate of interest r∗. Figure 4 displays the increase in the con-
sumption loss if the model takes the zero lower bound into account for alternative values of r∗. The
Figure 4: Loss increase if the zero bound is taken into account
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the increase in consumption losses if the model takes the zero nominal interest rate bound into
account for alternative values of the steady state level of the efﬁcient real rate of interest, r
∗. The left panel shows the results
for the discretionary policy regimes and the right panel shows the results for the commitment regimes.
left panel displays the welfare implications for optimal discretionary policy, considering three alter-
native cases: the unconstrained regime, the constrained regime that employs only the monetary policy
tool, and the unconstrained regime with activist ﬁscal policy, where ˜ λG is chosen optimally.15 For
all three regimes, the welfare costs associated with the existence of the zero bound increase when r∗
is lowered. However, while the two regimes that allow for ﬁscal stabilization policy experience only
modest loss increases, the performance of the constrained regime without ﬁscal policy deteriorates
considerably. The right panel of Figure 4 displays the welfare loss increases for the two commitment
cases: the unconstrained regime and the constrained regime without ﬁscal policy. Lowering the steady
15When varying r
∗, the subjective discount factor β is adjusted accordingly. For r
∗ below 3.3 percentage points (annual-
ized), the numerical algorithm for the constrained discretionary regime does not converge.
17state of the efﬁcient real rate has only minor effects on the performance of a policymaker who can
commit to state-contingent plans.
A parameter of special interest is the inverse of the elasticity of the marginal utility of public good
consumption with respect to total output ω. The parameterization of ω does only affect the perfor-
mance of the unconstrained regime. Figure 5 displays the increase in the consumption loss under
discretion if the model takes the zero bound into account for alternative values of ω ranging from 0.1
to 3.16 The steady state private consumption to output ratio is held constant at the baseline value of
0.8. When monetary and ﬁscal policy are both used as stabilization tools, the welfare costs associated
Figure 5: Loss increase under discretionary policy if the zero bound is taken into account
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the increase in consumption losses under discretionary policy if the model takes the zero nominal
interest rate bound into account for alternative values of the inverse of the elasticity of the marginal utility of public good
consumption with respect to total output, ω.
with the presence of the zero bound shrink with rising ω. On the other hand, when ω approaches zero,
the welfare costs come closer to those of the constrained regime.
16Results for the commitment regime are not shown since in this case the zero bound imposes only negligible welfare
costs on monetary policy.
188 Conclusion
This paper determines optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy under discretion and under commitment in a
small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Under both
policy regimes, ﬁscal policy is part of the optimal stabilization policy mix during zero bound episodes.
Under discretion, using government spending as a second policy instrument in addition to the short-
term nominal interest rate eliminates to a large extent the - otherwise potentially substantial - welfare
costs associated with the presence of the zero bound. The welfare gains from ﬁscal stabilization
policy can be enhanced by the appointment of an activist policymaker who puts less weight on the
stabilization of government spending than the private sector does. Under commitment, the welfare
gains from ﬁscal stabilization policy remain small. When the policymaker is able to credibly commit
to state-contingent future policy actions, monetary policy alone is able to offset most of the adverse
effects arising from the zero lower bound.
The analysis in this paper relies on a stylized model that has been widely used for policy analysis.
An important avenue for future work would be to extend the analysis to more complex medium-scale
macroeconomic models and to compare the gains from ﬁscal stabilization policy to those of other
policy measures that have been considered in the recent ﬁnancial crisis, such as a higher inﬂation
target and unconventional monetary policy tools.
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